Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Some possible elements to be taken into account in the review process

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. It is important for the States parties to reconfirm the crucial role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The States parties should reconfirm that the stability of the Treaty regime is essential to the maintenance of world peace and security.

2. The new NPT review process is qualitatively different from past efforts. The decisions taken at the NPT Extension and Review Conference in 1995 require that the review process contribute to the promotion of full implementation of the Treaty and its universality, and particularly to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

3. Substantive aspects of the preparatory work must be fully considered in addition to making procedural preparations for the Review Conference.

4. The task of the Preparatory Committee is to review the operation and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. But it is also important to take fully into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, especially the decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".

5. It would not be useful to aim at achieving a consensus document at each Preparatory Committee meeting. Rather, the most appropriate and productive procedure would be for the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee meeting to issue a summary report, under his or her sole responsibility, with necessary annexes.

6. The final report, to be submitted to the Conference by the Preparatory Committee, should be prepared at the last Preparatory Committee meeting. It should include two parts, one reviewing the Treaty, and the other recommending measures for the future.

7. A revision of the document on "Principles and objectives" would not be desirable, since it was the product of arduous negotiations pursued at the 1995

Review and Extension Conference and it stands on its own. Rather, it is important to strive to agree on a new set of objectives.

8. As the matter of overlap in the discussions of issues by the three Committees established during the past Review Conference is noted in paragraph 5 of the decision on "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty", appropriate attention should be paid to this matter by the Preparatory Committee.

II. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

9. The ultimate goal in nuclear disarmament is the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. Towards this end, it is important to accumulate steadily, one by one, realistic and effective disarmament measures, taking into account the realities of the international security environment.

10. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a major step in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially as a means of constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for all States signatories, by contributing to the work of the CTBT Preparatory Committee, to make steady efforts to establish the CTBT regime, including verification systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty. Those States which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty are urged to do so at the earliest possible date.

11. Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next step in nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that negotiations on FMCT have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament. All means should be explored to realize the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

12. Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally are an important element in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI. The commitment made by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation at the Helsinki summit meeting to further reduce, in the context of the START process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007, is most welcome.

13. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon State are further encouraged. In light of General Assembly resolution 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", every nuclear-weapon State is invited to inform the international community of the activities and progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. These efforts would contribute to transparency and confidence-building.

14. The efforts of the international community to promote and assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the management and disposal of fissile materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons should be further encouraged.

15. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further steps such as gradually taking nuclear forces off alert and/or removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.

16. The importance of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States of the NPT regime is fully recognized. Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the "Principles and objectives".

17. In the light of recent encouraging developments, it is important to reaffirm that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.

18. Great progress has been made towards the ultimate goal of the universality of the NPT. The States parties should unite their efforts to encourage States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it as soon as possible. It would be useful to promote dialogue and confidence-building among the countries concerned so as to improve their regional security environment.

III. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

19. It is noteworthy that a model protocol on measures of the second part of the "Programme 93+2" was adopted in the Drafting Committee to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards. It is strongly hoped that this model protocol will be adopted by the IAEA Special Board of Governors in May.

20. Efforts should be strengthened to increase the effectiveness and transparency of export control systems through the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Zangger Committee.

21. The entry into force, in October 1996, of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is a welcome development. The Group of Experts is to be commended for its tireless efforts to finalize the draft text of a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Group's recommendation that a diplomatic conference be convened with a view to adopting the Convention is also worthy of support.

22. It is important that the transport of nuclear materials should be conducted in a safe and secure manner and in compliance with the safety standards of IAEA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), while navigational rights and freedoms as provided for in the applicable rules of international law should not be impaired.

IV. SOME PROCEDURAL ISSUES

23. New York should be the venue of all Preparatory Committee meetings as well as the Review Conference itself, in order to facilitate the participation of a large number of States. It should also be noted that the cost of conference services is much lower in New York than in other cities.

24. It is necessary and important to keep the costs of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference reasonably low. Thus it is recommended that the length of each background document be limited to a specific number of pages. The necessity of issuing summary records of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should be carefully considered, and if records are issued, the number should be limited to the minimum.

25. The formula for apportioning the costs of the review process should follow established precedent. This means that the nuclear-weapon States, which have a special status under the Treaty, would be responsible for 55 per cent of the costs.